Asset Management by Lancastle, Neil
  1 
Asset management 
 
Neil M. Lancastle 
 
Asset management is the investment of financial assets by a third party. Financial assets 
under management (AUM) are categorised according to asset classes: equities, bonds 
and alternatives such as property, currency and commodities. Equities represent an 
ownership interest in another corporation, including a share of the profits as a dividend 
and a claim in the event of bankruptcy. Bonds represent an obligation to re-pay a loan 
and, normally, a coupon. Alternatives include a wide range of tradeable assets where the 
asset manager expects to earn a profit. 
 
There are two main investment strategies: active and passive management. Under active 
management, there is often greater flexibility in the investment mandate. Passive 
management or index-tracking funds are more closely aligned to a benchmark, which 
usually reflects the market capitalization of a broad set of constituent assets in a sector 
or country. Passive management took off after the 1970s and had a 13 per cent share at 
the end of 2005 (Pastor and Stambaugh, 2012, p. 759). Both active and passive 
strategies encompass a variety of investment objectives such as yield or growth 
maximization, tax avoidance and socially responsible investment. Funds are also 
segregated by asset class, country and industry sector. Lastly, funds often incorporate 
derivatives such that a Brazilian equity fund might be denominated in US dollars. 
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The quantitative techniques of asset management have their origins in a broad body of 
theoretical work (Markowitz, 1952; Modigliani and Miller, 1958; Merton, 1972; Black 
and Scholes, 1973). These techniques are used to construct a fund from a combination 
of derivatives, risky assets and a risk-free asset, usually a government bond. By 
synthetically matching the risk and return characteristics of third-party benchmarks, 
managers distance themselves from the investment decision. These decisions are 
retained by the investor, who in turn might rely on investment advisors, benchmark and 
performance data. 
 
Quantitative techniques also introduce new problems. They extrapolate return and risk 
from historical data, ignoring Knightian uncertainty and assuming a normal distribution 
of returns despite contrary evidence (see Mandelbrot, 1963). The use of derivatives 
introduces counterparty risk as well as profit opportunities for other financial actors. 
Index-tracking ignores Roll’s critique that the benchmark is hypothetical and 
unobservable (Roll, 1978); an index-tracking fund can miss out on profit opportunities 
or anomalies unless a specialized benchmark is used. Assets that have a lower volatility 
(called “beta”) than the benchmark have been shown to outperform; currency markets 
have shown long-term profit opportunities (carry trade); and the existence of high net 
worth financial actors is another persistent anomaly. 
 
Asset management is concentrated in relatively few, global firms that are geographically 
concentrated. In 2012, global AUM were 120 billion US dollars or 170 per cent of gross 
world product. Around two-thirds are long-term investments managed by pension, 
insurance and mutual funds. The remainder are managed on behalf of wealthy 
  3 
individuals and sovereigns in private wealth, sovereign wealth, private equity and hedge 
funds. Almost half are US firms, and clusters exist in global financial centres such as 
New York and London (TheCityUK, 2012, p. 4). This concentrates equity ownership 
interests. Tracing ownership connections between transnational corporations (TNCs) 
shows that “nearly 4/10 of the control over the economic value of TNCs in the world is 
held […] by a group of 147 TNCs in the core” (Vitali et al., 2011, p. 4). The top fifteen 
TNCs are either fund managers or combined fund managers and investment banks. 
 
There has been an observed tendency for smaller funds to disappear due to the selective 
culling of underperforming funds (Elton et al., 1996) as well as mergers and 
acquisitions. In Europe, the single market has enabled further consolidation. The 
intention of the Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities 
(UCITS) Directives, which began in 1985, was to create a single market for asset 
managers across Europe; it also created problems in cross-border regulation and 
opportunities for regulatory arbitrage. The UCITS cause célèbre was Bernard Madoff’s 
asset management firm, revealed in 2008 as a massive Ponzi scheme. The firm had been 
UCTS registered in Luxembourg and was responsible for “the largest investor fraud 
ever committed by an individual” (Weber and Gruenewald, 2009, p. 1). In Luxembourg, 
local regulations permitted custody of the non-existent assets in the United States 
without direct surveillance. 
 
Asset management is therefore of concern to central bankers and regulators from several 
perspectives: financial stability, competition policy, and the on-going possibilities of 
fraud and collusion. 
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